Today’s Herald letter: “Well Done Nicola!” (Really)

THE proposal of Nicola Sturgeon for a Scottish (or English, or Welsh, or Northern Irish) veto in an in-out EU referendum is to be very much welcomed.

It is very much in line with the position of many other countries where constitutional change must be subject to a high level of approval by the population. Examples of this principle include the United States, which requires a two-thirds majority for amendments to the Constitution, and Canada, where a “double majority” of voters and provinces applies. To adopt a similar requirement for constitutional measures in the UK would be an excellent measure.

Let us hope that the Smith Commission adopts this proposal from Ms Sturgeon, as it would ensure that any independence proposal for Scotland would require a referendum of the whole UK, and allow a veto to voters in Wales, Northern Ireland and England.

Well done, Nicola.

Peter A Russell,

Latest on Labour List. Originally: “What should Scottish Labour do? Here’s what!”

There is much talk in the Scottish media about a crisis in Scottish Labour. Some of it is of course froth (is the Scottish Daily Mail where we would seek advice in our best interest?) But some of it is substantial, being based on the post-poll evidence that anything between 30-40% of Labour voters voted Yes in the referendum.

The angst is also heightened by the surge in SNP membership to nearly 80,000, making them the third largest political party in the UK. Moreover, it is not only the numbers that are important: when the surge was first reported, the Glasgow Herald quoted ‘a senior Yes source’ as saying: “[the new SNP members] are all united in hating Labour.”

In other words, having failed to break the UK, the Yessers would gleefully, as a close second best, like to break Scottish Labour.  It is against this background that we look to the next three years and their respective elections: Westminster 2015, Holyrood 2016, and local councils 2017.

Taken together, these elections are now an existential challenge for the party in Scotland: if we fail, we put at risk our potential to be a force in Scottish politics again in the foreseeable future, and perhaps ever.

So what should Scottish Labour do? Here are some basic ideas to get working on.

First, let’s give some leadership: Scottish Labour has to take the political process by the lapels and show it who’s boss  – as in who won the referendum, and who is going to dictate to whom in the coming weeks and months.

Alex Salmond spoke about “holding the feet of the UK parties to the fire” over extra Holyrood powers, and Nicola Sturgeon looks like she will follow suit. Tough – they lost the referendum by a clear majority and it is their feet that should be held to the fire until they admit that fact. This is not just in Scottish Labour’s interest, but it is our duty to the 55% of Scottish voters who voted No to dominate the argument.

Like the old Scottish football manager Jimmy Sirrel said “the best team always wins and the rest is only gossip.” Scottish Labour needs to be clear that we are on the side of the majority and of democracy. We need to keep the SNP painted into its losing corner with the minority, aligned with the 45ers and the UDIers in the anti-democracy fringe.

Secondly, Scottish Labour must upscale the appeal of our unique selling point: that we are a party of UK government.

Most immediately, we must make it clear that as part of the winning side in the referendum, we can and will act to safeguard the outcome.

It should therefore be announced as soon as possible as a headline commitment in next May’s General Election manifesto that no Labour government will agree to a new Scottish independence referendum: not in the next Parliament, not ever.

Thirdly, we must use our status as a UK party which can and will influence the big agendas of the coming years. The defeat of independence means that the essential issues of the economy and  welfare, as well as defence and foreign affairs, remain at Westminster, meaning that Labour has a role in these areas which the SNP cannot rival.

Our message must be that if Scots want a voice in shaping the next decades, they are will be fools to waste their vote on the SNP. And if they want those decades to be socially progressive and economically successful, they will be wise to vote Labour.

Finally, we must look at how these cases, all based on the votes of the majority and common sense, can be presented effectively. Every night on television we see the SNP and the defeated Yessers acting as if their campaign was still alive or as if they won the referendum.  Labour’s campaign and public relations resources must be used to make sure that they do not go unchallenged.  

The SNP claim that No voters will be angry if new powers are not delivered to Holyrood: in fact, many No voters are already enraged by the way that their votes are being ignored by the SNP and by media commentators obsessed with the Yes vote. The message is easy enough: Yes lost, and anyone continuing to argue the independence  case should have their credibility shredded at every possible opportunity.

The referendum campaign showed that we have the people to do the job. Let’s use them. We can and must show up Yes for what it is: a zombie movement, running around causing havoc after life expired from its cause in the early morning of 19^th September.

These steps do not address some of the issues which we face heading into the subsequent Holyrood Elections, although presenting ourselves as ‘Scotland’s UK party of social democracy’ in opposition to the SNP as ‘Scotland’s Party of Scotland’ has to be an advantage. It could even be a foundation for what we could call ‘Scotland’s Social Contract’ – a narrative which puts together our achievements, our polices and our objectives as we go forward into 2016.

Above all, however, they are steps which are bold enough to grab the initiative and set the agenda for the 2015 General Election in post-referendum Scotland. Moreover, they offer what people want and what Scotland needs.

Historic personal first.

First use of bus pass! (Feel free to laugh)

Herald letter today (no paywall)

This is a reponse to a letter of 20th October, second here: http://www.heraldscotland.com/comment/letters/sturgeon-has-earned-chance-to-take-the-country-forward.25627368. The Herald cut my original first sentence; my original is in italics.

[Like most Yes supporters, David C. Purdie has not got very much right over the past two years, so he will enjoy the novelty of being correct in describing me as neither an SNP voter or sympathiser.] 

DAVID C Purdie is correct in describing me as neither an SNP voter nor sympathiser (Letters, October 20). I am indeed one of the clear majority of Scottish voters who unambiguously voted No to Scottish independence, and I believe that is our democratic right to have our vote recognised by the incoming First Minister.

To do so, all Nicola Sturgeon has do is to tell us: “I believe in self-determination and so cannot and should not disagree with the verdict of the Scottish people. Independence has been rejected, so on my watch, the Scottish Government will not pursue that aim, nor do anything which might put Scotland’s status as part of the UK at risk.”

It does not seem unreasonable to expect Nicola Sturgeon, coming into office in full knowledge of the will of the Scottish people, to pledge to work in their interest, which has now been defined in the clearest possible terms: Scotland will continue as part of the UK.

Indeed, it is difficult to see why she would wish to become First Minister if she did not intend to do so. Like I said, over to you, Nicola.

Peter A Russell

 

What I Told Lord Smith…..

In his memoir “Power Trip” (to be recommended) Damien McBride recounts how in public consultations, more notice is sometimes taken of individual submissions than of predictable corporate and vested interests. So I decided that it was worth writing to Lord Smith.

Here is my submission, which to a considerable extent reflects the need to protect the union if devolution is to be maximised.

 

17^th October 2014.

Dear Lord Smith,

The Smith Commission.

No doubt you have many submissions from the public regarding extra powers for the Scottish Parliament, in addition to those of the three political parties and that of the Scottish Government.

I would like to make the following points, of which I hope you will take notice in your deliberations.

1. It is essential that your Commission makes no recommendation which weakens the United Kingdom.

The people of Scotland decided conclusively that Scotland should not be an independent country: this is the one single and indisputable fact that matters in the referendum outcome. You may recall the old Scottish football manager Jimmy Sirrel, who coined the aphorism “the best team always wins and the rest is only gossip.” In this case, the extra powers are part of the gossip, as clearly as a good but losing performance on the football pitch does not win.

Therefore, any submission or proposal based on “not how far we fell short, but on how far we have come [towards independence]” as Alex Salmond put it, must be dismissed.

2. It therefore follows that this principle should be reflected in the legislative outcome of the Commission’s work.

Most immediately, this means that if the permanent status of the Scottish Parliament is enshrined in UK law, the overall authority of Scotland’s UK Parliament must also be codified and enshrined in that law, together with the relationship between the two institutions.

Any new law must state clearly that:

• The Union of Parliaments is permanent and binding on all parts of the UK
• The UK Parliament holds ultimate democratic sovereignty for all parts of the UK
• The Scottish Parliament is a permanent democratic institution of the UK (i.e., not of Scotland) as are the Assemblies in Cardiff and Belfast.

 

3. The outcome of the Independence Referendum is binding and permanent.

This is of course the logical conclusion of the Edinburgh Agreement. However, it is clear that this principle is in danger of being breached by the outgoing and incoming First Ministers, neither of whom have ruled out a further referendum, or recommended a moratorium.

The Edinburgh Agreement demanded that the referendum should be “legal and fair producing a decisive and respected outcome.” These requirements have been met beyond all reasonable doubt.  However, if the Scottish electorate are to have confidence in the referendum and its aims as set out in the Agreement (and in turn the democratic process as a whole), it is also clear that its outcome should be seen to be permanent. There are a number of ways that this can be achieved.

One would be to enshrine in law a moratorium on future referendums (for a period of for example 50 years). During that period, a referendum resolution would be specifically ultra vires for the Scottish Parliament. Another device might be a requirement to reach a high level of demand for a new referendum (for example votes of two-thirds of the Scottish Parliament AND of two-thirds of the UK House of Commons, these being the current margins required to dissolve those bodies.)

4. There is a need for the Scottish Parliament to be subject to a scrutiny process.

It was one of the original theories of the Scottish Parliament that the combination of a proportional electoral system and an effective committee structure would guard against the dominance of any party or partisan interest. Since the election of 2011 this has been proven not be the case. It is therefore now clear that any extra powers should be conditional on extra scrutiny of the Holyrood legislative process.

This scrutiny could be achieved within current resources by using Scotland’s Westminster MPs (excluding those in government) as a scrutiny body, with well-defined powers of delay and revision of legislation. The Scottish Parliament could sit for three days per week and the MPs use the Chamber for the other two weekdays for this purpose.

(This de facto ‘double majority’ system would dovetail with some of the proposals to deal with ‘English Votes for English Laws.’  England’s MPs could sit for the same two days at Westminster to scrutinise ‘English’ legislation approved by the whole Commons, which could therefore also acquire a double majority.)

5. The process of devolution should not be confined to Holyrood.

It is now anticipated that the Scottish Independence Referendum will act as a catalyst for some devolution within England, which may be based on city-regions. If this is the case, Manchester, Birmingham, etc. will have a range of additional self-government powers and responsibilities. These could include powers over personal and business taxation as well as responsibilities for health, economic development, housing and structure planning.

If in Scotland these powers are retained at Holyrood, Scottish cities will be at a considerable disadvantage to the English regional cities and city-regions. The Commission should therefore also consider recommending that devolution should be extended to Scottish city regions, especially Greater Glasgow and Edinburgh/Lothians.

These could have a similar status as the German Hansestädte (Hamburg, Bremen) and Berlin which have a similar constitutional position to the federal  Bundesländer (Brandenburg, Bavaria etc.) As in the case of Germany, this position also reflects the history of these cities which had been founded on international mercantile and industrial relationships, and were therefore anomalous in their domestic context. This is especially so in the case of Glasgow (‘Second City of the Empire’.)

This further distribution of constitutional power to city-regions could also have the effect of making a spurious or opportunist call for a further referendum less likely to be successful.

Finally, I would conclude that more devolution can only come about in the context of a strong centre .  

In this, I return to my first point – that the outcome of the Commission’s deliberations must reinforce the Union of Parliaments, and in no way risk weakening it.  The corollary is that the potential for any further devolution is directly proportional to the strength of the centre (i.e., the Union.)

Conversely, if the centre is not strengthened appropriately, the work of the Commission will be restricted in its scope. This would of course not be an unacceptable outcome to the vast majority who voted No on 18^th September, as –to reiterate – the only result which is absolute is No to independence.

However, many of us who wish to see greater decentralisation of power within both the UK and Scotland would regard an outcome which did not achieve that aim as a lost opportunity.

I hope that this submission has been of interest and assistance to you.

Yours sincerely,

 

Peter A. Russell

 

Yes Vote – Nationalism or Despair? – Courtesy of David Webster.

At the meeting of Glasgow Fabians on 11th October, our friend David Webster produced the following graph. (Click on image to enlarge) I have also included his excellent commentary. 

THE YES VOTE – NATIONALISM OR DESPAIR?

The attached chart shows that most (71%) of the variation in the Yes vote share in the Referendum across Scottish local authorities can be explained by the percentage of the population living on means tested benefits or tax credits, as defined in the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation. This is a very strong effect by any standards and suggests that other explanations – such as pre-existing commitment to nationalism as shown by the previous SNP vote, or religious affiliation – have little power. The chart suggests that actual preference for independence is no greater than it was known to be already – i.e. at most one third of the electorate. This is indicated by the evidence in the chart that a hypothetical local authority with no one on benefits would have voted No by 73% to 27%.

The chart also shows that the significance of the Yes vote in Glasgow has been overstated. The city was absolutely in line with the national trend, once deprivation is taken into account. Dundee and Highlands, by contrast, had clearly bigger Yes votes than the national trend would suggest, while Orkney, Scottish Borders and Dumfries & Galloway had lower Yes votes.

A 1 percentage point increase in the percentage of population on benefits increased the Yes vote by 1.3 percentage points. This shows that the ‘benefits’ effect cannot have been due simply to voting by people currently on benefits. Also, Lord Ashcroft’s poll at http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2014/09/scotland-voted/ has only 10% of voters saying that benefits were among the two or three most important influences on their vote. So the ‘benefits’ effect is probably both representing people on benefits and proxying for something else. What is the something else?

The Catholic archbishop of Glasgow has argued (Herald, 23/9/2014) that ‘despair and deprivation’ were key factors in the vote, because too many people ‘feel threatened and disheartened by poor life chances’. He seems to be right. Certainly, the Yes campaign appeared to gain enormous traction through constant references to issues such as the bedroom tax and the growth of Food Banks, while Labour Party dissidents like Bob Holman specifically campaigned to win over disadvantaged people to Yes.

The claim that independence would help the disadvantaged is based on hope, not evidence. Bob Holman likes to attack the Westminster parliament for its social privilege – but Scottish MSPs are four times more likely to have gone to private schools than their constituents (Herald, 7/4/2014), and there are more ex-manual workers in the House of Lords than there are in the Scottish Parliament. The SNP largely represents constituencies which were previously Tory. And the SNP’s record in government is hardly encouraging – a 25% cut in further education funding while universities stay free, a council tax freeze which cuts services on which poor people rely but disproportionately benefits the better-off, an almost total lack of progressive labour market policies. Not to mention, of course, that a post-independence Scotland would be beset by funding problems, due to factors such as the costs of setting up a new state, the need to build up currency reserves, the loss of tax revenue from companies moving south, higher borrowing costs, unfavourable EU entry terms, and loss of population due to discriminatory policies against migrants from the rest of the UK. The Irish Free State in the 1920s and 1930s offers a salutary warning – it cut old age pensions and school meals to pay for lucrative new state jobs, lost more population after independence than before, and by repudiating its debt (the ‘land annuities’), provoked a trade war with the UK which caused lasting damage to the Irish economy.

Nevertheless there is a lot of work for the Labour movement to do. The lesson that it was neoliberal policies, mainly of the Tories since Thatcher, which nearly lost the Union, while it was the Labour movement that saved it, needs to be hammered home. It has to challenge the Yes campaigners now to shift their energies to delivering the policies and programmes to tackle disadvantage which lie within the soon-to-be expanded powers of the Scottish Parliament. And it has to show that neoliberalism can be defeated across the UK.

 

Letter in Herald (no paywall)

Sturgeon should now confirm that independence has been rejected

Friday 17 October 2014

YOU report that Nicola Sturgeon is to go on progress through Scotland ahead of her coronation as leader of the SNP and in turn First Minister (“Sturgeon in unprecedented tour before Cabinet reshuffle”, The Herald, October 16).

 This should be welcomed as an excellent oppor­tunity for her to elaborate on her social democratic credentials.

On the “social” side, she may wish to apologise to her followers for the SNP’s failure to take action on poverty and inequality in Scotland in her party’s seven years in office, and set out how she intends to address these issues. The old game of blaming Westminster is no longer viable now that Scots have confirmed their view that such matters as employment and welfare should be addressed on the level of the whole UK.

Indeed, Ms Sturgeon will only show real leadership of both her party and of the country if she has the courage to embrace the democratic will of the Scottish people. She must tell them that in the referendum the voters rejected independence, that it is a lost cause, and there will not be a further referendum in the foreseeable future.

Anything else would not only be denial of the “democratic” part of “social democrat” but a betrayal of the right of self-determination of the Scottish people, as exercised on September 18. Over to you, Nicola.

Peter A Russell

Referendum Victory: Catastrophe Averted – or Deferred?

(The following is a slightly amended version of my Glasgow Fabians presentation.)

First, the title: Referendum victory: a catastrophe averted – or deferred?

Part 1: Catastrophe:

Let us consider two potential catastrophes: most immediately, for Scotland, Scottish economy and Scottish people.

And also for Labour – will come to implications for Labour Party later.

First, need to be very clear how great the risk of economic catastrophe was.

If vote had been Yes, we would already have following effects:

• £100millions which went back on Scottish companies on Friday 19^th September would have stayed off, and would have been added to, at accelerating pace.
• Orders would not have been placed at Rosyth and for Clyde Shipyard
• Contingency plans in Scottish-based companies would have become operational
• Thousands of house sale transactions would have been cancelled
• Thousands of investment decisions would have been at least delayed, many cancelled
• Thousands of job offers would not have been made by employers
• Above all, party conferences would have seen Labour, Tories and Lib Dems re-iterating rejection of Currency Union. They would do so rationally and pragmatically, as it would be preferable to take short-term but quantified (if hefty) hit, rather than indefinite and unquantifiable (and probably even more costly)

Medium term prospect for Scottish economy would have been either joining the Euro and being linked to most sluggish and conservative currency management in the developed world, now on the brink of returning to recession combined with deflation;

or sterlingisation, which would have required public expenditure cuts to build required balances.

Add to these £6 billion per annum deficit identified by the IFS and catastrophe is not hyperbolic: massive business uncertainty and cash/capital flight added to massive public expenditure cuts.

It is notable that these proposals were greeted by Adam Smith Institute but not surprising.

To those who bought Salmond’s “they are only bluffing” line or even considered Stiglitz’s views in contrast to Krugman’s there is one argument: would you risk it?

For Labour, a Yes vote would also have been a catastrophe.

First, and foremost, a catastrophe for the people we represent: public expenditure cuts, job losses, higher interest rates meaning higher credit and mortgages and unemployment caused by jobs moving south.

Ian Smart wrote in his blog of:

“The idea that there is likely to be no major financial consequence to Independence is bordering on the delusional. And not just consequence for “the country”. Financial consequence for every voter. And their children. And their parents. And their friends. We have to say that loud and clear. Yes means a devalued currency; higher prices in the shops; lower pensions and benefits in real terms; mass unemployment; collapsed property prices.

“Independence is not something we could “give a try” and then change our minds about later. It would involve not “a wee bit of hardship” as some of the less dishonest Nats might concede. It would involve years of grinding misery with living standards butchered and with the civil unrest and human misery that would inevitably follow.

http://ianssmart.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/time-to-be-blunt.html

He bases his view on that set out by David Smith, Economics Editor of the Sunday Times. http://www.economicsuk.com/blog/002045.html#more

Or as Paul Krugman, top Keynsian and Nobel Laureate, put it: “Scotland would be like Spain without the sunshine.” – And, of course as in financial crisis, it would be the least well-off who would suffer most. So a catastrophe for the people Labour works for.

So Labour could only back a No vote, and politically, a Yes vote would have been politically catastrophic for Labour.

First, it would have exposed the weakness of Labour’s position in Scotland. Our recovery from the poor performance of 2010 and the disaster of 2011 is fragile to say the least. Anyone who has campaigned knows that out strength on the ground is desultory despite the efforts of some really energetic people. But the underlying trend is a steady loss of votes and a weakening power base which has been masked by the FPTP system and multi-party splits. It is as the SNP hoovers up the votes of the weaker parties that their strength grows.

Secondly, a Yes vote would have been the death knell of our Labour MSPs. One of the causes of the 2011 debacle had been our underlying weakness at Holyrood, shown up in performance of  our MSPs in opposition since 2011.

Again, failure would have continued and accelerated the decline of Labour at Holyrood and the advance of the SNP.

Of course supporting No was not without risk. In particular, association with the Tories has inevitably led to accusations of caring more for business than people, selling out the ghosts of Keir Hardie and Attlee and all the rest. I will come back to this later when addressing the challenges we face, and how we might go on from here.

However, it is worth putting forward the point that Labour was effectively the custodian of the biggest share of the potential No vote, that is the part of the electorate less likely to vote Yes or the for the SNP. It was in effect, Labour’s referendum to win or to lose.

Add this to the elements which I have already outlined, and Labour’s stake in the referendum was a battle for our existence. If we had lost the referendum, Labour in Scotland would have been finished.

Don’t take my word for it: if Nicola Sturgeon said it would be the best thing that could happen for us, expect the opposite to be true and there you have it. For Labour, the referendum was an existential struggle.

Part 2: Catastrophe averted – or deferred?

So on to the second part, in which I will try to address the issue of how we might proceed – and will start with a bit of how we got here.

I should also fill in some details about my own involvement in Better Together. In short I worked in the better together office two afternoons per week from September 2013, so about a year.

In that time I saw it staff up and develop and eventually succeed. I was not at any time involved in strategy – although I did make some suggestions – and I was involved at times in some research work, writing some articles which appeared around the web. And like everyone else, I was involved in the massive logistical exercises like posting 100,000s of direct mail shots.

By the time I arrived the strategy had been formulated and was roughly as follows:

Weaknesses:

• Yes was (at that point) better funded and could not be out advertised
• Yes had advantages of Salmond’s position as FM and personality, press profile etc
• Yes had advantages of Scottish Govt incumbency, therefore of arts, business, voluntary sector patronage
• Yes had advantages of sentiment, heart over head widespread buy-in from cultural figures etc.
• Yes had advantages conceded by UK Govt of Question (they had Yes.)
• Yes had electoral data of SNP on support for independence
• Tory government with 1 seat in Scotland, i.e. perceived lack of legitimacy of Westminster

Strengths:

• No had far greater credibility on technical detail of proposals as any conjecture could be tested against real life
• No had far greater credibility on currency and therefore economy: eg the IFS vs Business for Scotland
• No had far greater credibility with business, the press and academics (who understood implications)
• No had overwhelming past support from all parties (inc SNP voters from 2011) – 40 years of No in opinion polls
• Support of majority political parties.
• Support of key trade unions like USDAW and GMB and crucially trade unionists in iconic industries, especially shipbuilding.

No strategy was therefore:

Not to try to compete on sentiment but on reason: based on political science

Alan Renwick, Reading University: In referendums as in the rest of life, heart precedes head. Interventions in a referendum campaign provoke heart reactions and head reactions: they stimulate our emotions and feelings; and they prompt reflection on what fits our principles and aspirations. But, just as in life in general, these reactions differ in their speed. The heart comes first. Only later does the head begin to take over. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/scotlands-referendum-debate-what-is-really-going-on/

and reflecting contemporary psychology (Daniel Kahneman’s “Thinking Fast And Slow” or the conflict between “intuitive System 1 and deliberative System 2 thinking”) – despite first reaction usually for Yes, NO can win on rational grounds, given the correct material and enough time.

• To use social media in early stages rather than public meetings, events etc
• To concentrate overwhelmingly on information rather than sloganizing and events
• Use of direct mail and telephone canvassing
• To measure success during campaign by focus groups and private polling
• Follow basic structure of Obama campaign (risk not “Yes we can” but “no we can’t” is not a good fit)
• Avoidance of UK/British imagery (i.e., no extra votes in band of the Grenadier Guards, anymore than in “Do you want to live in one of the most prosperous countries in the world” when we already do.)

So what happened?

In short, Yes played a weak hand well. In particular,

• early emphasis on meetings and events generated internal momentum and morale
• support from media-savvy cultural community
• exploitation of key phrases like Project Fear
• capture of idealistic/radical agenda

 

No played a better hand moderately well. In particular

• Unity of parties and their resources
• Use of currency issue
• Infographics
• Exploitation of SNP dishonesty shown in office (EU advice)
• Careful use of names and personalities (Pennington, Wood, Branson, Geldolf, not Cameron, sparing use of Brown, Kennedy)
• Held nerve over longer term, so that late interventions were additional rather than substitute
• Successful organisation to get out the Vote: own experience was at 8:45 pm I was phoned by phone banker from Reading asking if I had voted. Impressive networking.

Which brings us to the final weeks, the Vow and Gordon Brown.

The key questions which will always be asked are:

• What difference did the YouGov poll make?
• How effective was the vow made through the Daily Record?
• Did Gordon Brown save the union?
• How did Labour lose so many votes for NO?

So: Yougov.  YouGov was identified early on as the pollster which had been most accurate in its measure of the 2011 Scottish election, and was that reason favoured by No. Yes had its own favoured pollsters, Survation and Panelbase. So it YouGov was taken seriously when it showed the gap first narrowing and then vanishing. If you look at those polls in fact, the poll of 1^st September showed Yes at 47% and No at 53%, easily within the standard 3% margin of error of the final outcome. These figures were repeated on 11^th and 17^th September.

But the poll of 5^th September showed Yes ahead.

However, the effect was entirely positive on the campaign (although its legacy is different.)

For the campaign, the effect on No was electrifying. I went into the Better Together office on the Monday afterwards and it was swamped by volunteers. Morale and determination had been galvanised. Speak as veteran of Bermondsey and Govan 88 bye-elections where moral slumped. This time, the phones were staffed and the envelopes were dispatched.

At the same time, the Labour Party was out doorknocking in its biggest ever ground operation: 300,000 doors knocked, and with  special attention to new entrants to the electoral roll.

The other reaction was of course from the political leadership: the three party leaders gave impression of urgent responders – or blind panic, and Gordon Brown reappeared with his old time Labour religion. But to what effect? –which is the second question.

The answer is not much – and a lot.

The not much is that it does not seem to have changed many minds: polling shows that only 10% made up their minds in final week, and of those 7% went to Yes and only 3% to No.

Instead the lot of difference may have been vital: the effect on turnout. Anyone who remembers 1992 knows how high turnout can favour the status quo, above all where change implies a clearly identified to risk. And the relationship between turnout and outcome in the referendum points out a further possible correlation: the lower the turnout, the higher the chance of a Yes vote. Lowest by turnout were: Glasgow (75%) and Dundee (78.5%).

In West Dumbartonshire something else may have gone on, with 6^th highest turnout but voting Yes: possibly due to Trident as a specific local issue. Which leaves N Lanarks as an anomaly.

Overall, there is speculation that increased turnout favoured Yes only up to a certain point (possibly around 80%) and above that point, it favoured No: it represented more people turning out to protect the union. And in that respect: not that of changing views, but in boosting turnout of No voters, Gordon Brown and the 3 leaders may have saved the union.

The legacy of the intervention is however more mixed, and will present a serious problem if it is not dealt with well. This is the widespread perception that the content of that intervention changed the minds of large numbers of voters, and therefore the outcome of devomax/devoplus will be crucial.

This is of course very convenient to the supporters of independence who believe devolution to be a halfway house, rather then the best of both worlds, or those who, as Salmond put it: “measure progress not be how far they fell short but by how far they had come.”

The myth which must not be allowed to take hold is that there is a large number of hitherto Yes voters who were swayed to No by promises of near-independence.

Which brings us onto the politics which we now face in the post-referendum age, which includes the issue of the loss of votes to Yes.

My conclusion is that Labour helped avert the catastrophe that would have been independence.

However, unless considerable political progress is made over the next two big elections, there is a real risk that it may be only a deferral. A battle has certainly been won, and the starting place is much better than it would have been, but there are many more battles to fight and win, and each of them are existential for the Scottish Labour Party and possibly for the union.

One of the big features of that post-referendum age is the strength of the SNP. Latest figures on social media put its membership at 100,000, and even at £12 per year per member, this demonstrates a formidable force than Labour has faced since the Tories went into decline in the 1970s. It is also at least another £1,200,000 to add to the Weir millions.

(The only silver lining is that these people have not done the smart thing and joined Labour to over-run us and turn us into a nationalist party.)

Disadvantages however, are massive. First, the numbers which the SNP will be able to mobilise.

Second, the motivation they share, born of the intensity of their hatred for Labour: language like “eviscerate” “bury forever” “destroy” etc: if they cannot have independence, the extermination of Labour will make a good second best. (Robin MacAlpine: “the biggest single obstacle to social progress in this country is Scottish Labour Party” – bigger than a Tory UK govt, rogue capitalism, poor employers, loan sharks, ill-health, poor housing, unemployment: yes, that is us.) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkC2qW8KhO8

Third, our own weakness: in membership, in engagement and in policy presentation. This includes presentation of our record, which may have had a bearing on the high numbers of people from deprived areas who voted Yes.

I know that this is nothing new, but I think this is a good place to begin discussion.

Here are a few things to chew on:

First, evidence of referendum is that our membership is low and our active membership is lower still. Having said that Labour knocked 300,000 doors and therefore has a new and current political data on those areas where No did not do well.

Second, as John McTernan has put it: “Scottish Labour at first was unwilling and then was ultimately unable to articulate Labour’s record” Or “when did you last hear a member of the Scottish Parliament praise the record of the Blair/Brown governments?”

My experience as an activist is perhaps instructive: trying to find  out what Labour actually did in power is a lot more difficult than finding out what we did not do, and what we did wrong.

It is quite incredible that when we look back to Labour’s achievements, we are more able to recite those of Attlee and Bevan, and not of Harold Wilson, Barbara Castle, Denis Healey, and certainly not of Tony Blair, Robin Cook and Gordon Brown. Anyone would think that Labour’s radical contribution finished in 1951.

For example, Bob Holman was widely paraded as a witness to how Labour had lost its purpose: this should have been made a nonsense of by common knowledge that Labour had achieved real life improvements for vast numbers of people in his patch of Easterhouse: the National Minimum Wage, the right to trade union representation, Pensioner Credit, and especially the GHA write-off of housing debt which transformed the area’s social housing from the worst in Europe to standards as good as anywhere in the UK.

(http://wp.me/p3f2py-6p is my full response to this.)

But it isn’t common knowledge for the public: it is probably not common knowledge amongst Labour members. Just like tripling spending on the NHS or raising 1 million children out of poverty at a time where inequality was rising across the developed world. Basically, Labour members must do more to support Labour’s record.

If we do not, no-one else will. There is no point in complaining about the press coverage, or about the fact that so many Yes voters were people with low educational achievement or few qualifications.

Labour lost votes from No to Yes because we could not articulate what we are for, and how it benefits our people.

Part of this selective amnesia is our lack of appreciation of and the failure to argue up devolution. There is a widespread lack of knowledge what Holyrood does and can do, and what it will be able to do. A visitor from Mars or even Manchester would not have known that Holyrood exists to listen to the referendum debates until the SNP brought up the NHS – and promptly rubbished its powers.

This was one of the reasons that Yes and the SNP were able to gain any traction with their NHS scares. People should know by now that if they complaints or fears about the NHS in Scotland, Holyrood is where you go to.

Finally, there is an issue of the weaknesses of the concept of membership. The Labour Party which I joined in 1977 had three main components: the party in the community (including local government, and internally social), the trade union party (or party in the workplace), and the co-operators party (or the party in the high street) –with a few add-ons like the Fabians.

With the exception of the latter (joke) all of these were directly connected with and offered  services to the public – and above all with “our” public. These are all areas where we are now weaker – not only due to our own failings but also due to changes in leisure activities, employment (especially) and shopping habits.

But we must find ways of recreating our links with the public, with workers and consumers, and making ourselves relevant to them and their concerns. The evidence that we have not filled the void is the enthusiasm of the Yes campaign; and its evil twin, the rise of UKIP. But I suspect we all know that.

In the meantime, where do we go from here?

First, we have to realise that although Labour has survived an existential battle in winning the referendum, it has two more to come immediately: the General Election in 7 months time, and the Holyrood election 12 months after that.

Then we might see where we are for the council elections 12 months after that. And if we fail in the General Election, we are in big trouble for the subsequent battles. The SNP’s expectation is to triple its Commons representation by gaining 12-15 seats, mainly at Labour’s expense, with a few like Argyll & Bute, Gordon coming from LibDems. That means Glasgow seats in particular.

So what do we do?

First, we accept that we need to use every resource: for example, all of the work done by councillors week in, week out, in their communities must be dovetailed into the election campaign;

Likewise, trade unions must fully engaged as far as their political funds allow. We must use the data and the infrastructure created for the referendum campaign.

Above all, Labour must campaign on our record as well as on how we will improve people’s lives. We have a narrative which relates their concerns and needs to the achievements of the past and to current policies.

Most immediately, we need to start to make the weather surrounding the ways forwards. This could include:

• Seize initiative in Smith Commission – where the hell are we? No presence at all on tv debate, last unionist party to submit evidence.
• Casting policies in a way which are not apologetic about either being economically credible or socially progressive
• Cast Yes and SNP as fighting battles of the past: referendum is as dead Bannockburn
• Exposing SNP record on equality and competence in NHS etc
• Turning new SNP members on their leaders: try to push them into looney left, Militant territory

Finally, I would refer to the comments made by John McTernan in Progress: http://www.progressonline.org.uk/2014/10/10/for-fox-sake/

and the quote from Norman Kirk of the New Zealand Labour Party: “New Zealanders don’t ask for much: someone to love, somewhere to live, somewhere to work and something to hope for.”

And McTernan’s own conclusion:

“We talk about housing policies when people want a home. We talk about jobs as an end in themselves when people see them as the start of something – the ability to make a downpayment on a dream. We see life as a set of problems to be solved by policies when people see life as something to be lived and enjoyed.”

In the referendum, Yes offered an illusion of that hope and of that dream.

And it was an illusion, and we were correct to reject it.

But we need to offer real hope and realistic ambition to the people of Scotland.

It a hell of a challenge. But it is worth taking up: it is the difference between a catastrophe averted and one merely deferred.

(Delivered at Glasgow Fabians, Saturday 11^th October 2014.)

Herald letter. (Beat the paywall)

Wednesday 8 October 2014

IT appears that DS Blackwood and his SNP friends had an enjoyable post-referendum day out talking to each other in Lochgilp­head (Letters, October 7).

It sounds as if they mustered about the same number of people who go to the shinty – good for them. However, they might have spent their time a lot more profitably if item one on their agenda had not been “the evils of the media and how they hoodwinked the electorate”, but “how our politics can best serve the people of Scotland in the post-referendum era”.

The new reality of that era is that there is one option off the table: independence, which has been rejected decisively by the people of Scotland. If the SNP’s contribution to the Smith Commission is to be in any way credible, it is essential that it accepts this reality: that the continuation of the Union is the settled will of the Scottish people for the foreseeable future.

In this light, it would be irrational and disrespectful to measure the success of the Smith Commission against the now-obsolete objective of independence. Instead, the main yardstick must be how extra devolution can strengthen Holyrood and the UK at the same time, and above all what is practical and workable. What Gordon Brown suggests is (as set out in his letter to his constituents) that “currency and macro-economy including fiscal and banking policy, pensions and the welfare state and foreign and security affairs would all remain at a UK level”. Certainly, the Smith Commission will reject any proposals which would weaken the Union.

The political parties which are committed to the democratic process, including the SNP, must acknowledge that their world has changed. Indeed, it is very disappointing that so far neither Nicola Sturgeon, the First Minister in waiting, nor the candidates for the post of Deputy First Manager, have acknowledged that, unlike their predecessors, they accept that Scotland has made its mind up that its future remains within the UK.

Peter A Russell,

Mastermind Again – and the Stones, John The Revelator at Chess Studios and Me.

First, how did I get on Mastermind on successive series, when there is normally a requirement to wait for two years? The answer is that only the six highest-scoring losers in each series go through to the semi-finals, and last year I was the seventh-highest scoring loser. (In fact, I was slap in the middle of semi-finalist scores, having amassed more than a lot of heat winners, but the rules are the rules…)

So I was stand-by in the 2013-14 semis, and as compensation for that, I got an audition-free place this year.

And how did I come to the Rolling Stones as a subject?

When you apply to Mastermind, you are required to offer four options. Last year, my first choice – the life and works of (another Pompey boy) Christopher Hitchens – was rejected on the grounds that a no set of questions could be assembled which was both verifiable and comprehensive enough. So I went with the history of Portsmouth FC, with my third choice – the Stones – as semi-final option. Which in turn became my first round option in 2104.

My choice of the Stones was based on three factors.

First, an interest which started at the age of 10, when on our two weeks holiday in Cornwall in 1965, the transistor radio and the Light Programme blasted out the wall of noise which was Not Fade Away. I was intrigued. In a pop world where the Beatles were near-omnipotent, my older brother Alan had already declared for the Stones, and my first hearing confirmed that this was indeed a force to be reckoned with.

Secondly, this all started at that age when our minds are like sponges. Between the ages of 10 and 15, we can remember incidents, facts and conversations like they were yesterday – in fact better than my 60 year old memory can recall yesterday. So facts useful for Mastermind should have a core learnt in those years.

Again, from Alan’s collection of 45s, I can recall the mystery and wonder of silver lettering on blue Decca labels: “Willy Dixon,” “B & S Womack,” “Andrew Loog Oldham.” And the news stories: pep pills and grass busts, paternity suits, Marianne, the band in court. And later, word from the cool guys at school who knew about Muddy Waters’ Rollin’ Stone Blues and that Brian played a “bottleneck” on Little Red Rooster.

Thirdly, I owe the Stones a huge debt. Keith Richards has described their early objectives as being a band possessed by a missionary zeal to keep alive the blues roots of rock and roll: with Buddy Holly dead, Elvis in the US Army and Chuck Berry in jail, two ill-matched kids from Dartford plus The Cheltenham Shagger were the contrarian antidote to showbiz blandness. When their varied talents were welded into a tight groove by the kick-arse metronome rhythm section of a dependable wedding band bassist and London’s top young jazz drummer, they became unstoppable.

Unstoppable, that is, in their zeal to bring to London and its suburbs the indefinable and unique sound and spirit of electric rhythm and blues. This time holds a particular fascination for me: the crowded and raucous nights at Crawdaddy at the Station Hotel, Richmond, the gigs for a dozen people, and the residencies at the 100 Club and Eel Pie Island. (I knew the island from my early childhood: my father Reg worked there building lifeboats in the late 40s and 50s. He took me there when we picked up my mother from work at Poppie’s factory in Twickenham on Fridays.) My elder cousins might have known about the Crawdaddy Club – maybe they turned down chances to go there.

Flash forward 50 years. I am  – amazingly – walking in the hot sunshine down South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Past Tony Jones’s Art Institute and Soldier Field on my left. Further and further down, with the people on the sidewalks thinning out, and African Americans becoming the majority. It is a longer way down to the South Side to 2120 South Michigan than I thought.

And when I get there, what does the Chess Studio look like? A small building, two shopfronts, and unadorned. A bell with “For Attention, Please Press” written on it. I check the address again, and press. I am greeted by an enormous and polite young African American guy who lets me in. There is the studio and a small display with old records, instruments, photos of the Howlin’ Wolf and Muddy Waters and Buddy Guy and Little Walter and Sonny Boy Williamson II (who was younger than SBW I).

But I am the only person there: my host asks curiously: “Are you a musician too, sir?” Of course I am not, and answer that I am just a fan, that I have been one since I first heard those Diddley changes and R&B inflections that day when I was 10 years old. The guy in the Chess Studios is incredulous, shakes his head and says quietly “10 years old…” Although to me it is the most natural thing in the world, I get the impression that this is unusual for him. After all, the place is empty. Not many white Americans and possibly fewer African Americans go to 2120 South Michigan, it seems.

I go back into the studio. It is a plain cream room, scuffed, quite small, with a screened off production box at one end. I try to imagine the bands set up in here: first the Stones laying down It’s All Over Now, but then the Wolf or Muddy, backed by Johnny Johnson’s barrelling piano and Little Walter’s squealing pleading harp, nailed to the floor by Willie Dixon’s doghouse upright bass and pinned to the wall by Earl Phillips’ drums. It must have been as tight as Chicago’s road grid and as loud as the L Elevated Railroad.

And something extraordinary happens: I feel the ghost of the vibration of that sound, the spirit of Muddy singing Mojo Working or the Wolf predating his way through Killing Floor. I am reminded of a Greek holiday when we went to the cave of St John on Patmos…John The Revelator, in fact, as sung of by Son House.

The nature of the revelation and of the success of the Stones’ mission is clear: electric blues, the fast and sexy feral voice of black America, scary and exhilarating, liberated and liberating, kicking down the doors of race and breaking out the windows of inhibition.

So that is what I owe to the Stones. Later, at the Mayor’s reception, I get my fair share of small talk as the band plays a version of the Blues Brothers’ iteration of Robert Johnson’s Sweet Home Chicago. But I also tell my story to Gus Noble, an expat Scot and musician. He recalls how he visited Chess and was introduced to a certain elderly Mrs Burnett: she had said: “you might know me as Mrs Wolf.”

And Mastermind?

Obviously, I enjoyed it, although I was more nervous second time around. It was the dread of the known rather than a fear of the unknown. This time while I was waiting in the condemned seat waiting to be called forward to the Chair, I would have run away, but I was on my own (and it would have been a stupid thing to do.)

So I stayed, and did not too badly. In fact, in my Stones round I only failed by one to get a perfect score.

What happened in the question “whose poem did Mick read at Hyde Park after Brian’s death?” was this. All of my adult life I have believed that it was Keats’ Endymion. Don’t ask me why, I just have. So when I read many times that it was in fact Shelley’s Adonis (written about Keats) I made a point of correcting myself. Until the question was put and the beeper went off. I thought “I know this, relax” and did. And said “Keats” – I had reverted to my passive, “background” memory and was wrong.

The other feature of the Stones questions was that I had joked in the week of recording with Gary, the bar manager at the Glasgow Art Club about my subject. He said immediately “the answer is Delia Smith.” And so it was.

So no perfect round, nor in my General Knowledge: I missed “cartoon” as I was thrown by the Italian etymology and my guess of “newt” was as wrong as had been in 2013. Japanese beef I might have got on good day: but the key here was not to go to pieces, not to pass and to get on to the next question.

There followed a bit of nail-biting as it then became clear that I was the winner, which was something of a surprise as the Mad Men bloke seemed well in control.

But it was still not All Over Now. I was recalled to re-record my introduction of my subject. John Humphreys had said “the Rolling Stones” which I had repeated when I started; now I had to go back to say “The Rolling Stones 1962-82.” This I did, and was thanked by Mr H who added: “congratulations: you did very well not to look smug.” But that had not been my point – I had been on a mission.

So some thanks: to the Mastermind production team, one of whom kindly remarked: “You are a year older, but you’ve not lost it.” (Thanks for that, Anthony, it makes me feel like Mick.)

To Alan of course.

To the Wolf and Muddy. And to the Stones.